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WATER AND SANITATION FOR ALL: PARTNERSHIPS AND INNOVATIONS
ACCESS TO SAFE and reliable supplies of water and hygienic
sanitation facilities is skewed, both racially and geographi-
cally, in South Africa. The Department of Water Affairs
and Forestry (DWAF, 1994) argues that “more than 12
million people do not have access to an adequate supply of
potable water; nearly 21 million lack basic sanitation”.
The black rural poor have the least access to these services
in South Africa (RDP, 1995). And it is estimated that 90
percent of rural schools and approximately 50 percent of
rural clinics lack adequate sanitation facilities (Palmer
Development Group, 1995).
In an effort to overcome the backlog in services, the
South African government has offered considerable subsi-
dies for household sanitation. Underlying the subsidy
policy are two related assumptions: one, that sanitation,
while vital to household health, is not a high priority
among disadvantaged communities whose scarce financial
resources are utilised for even more basic needs, such as
food, shelter, clothing and schooling; and two, that it will
be more efficient to lower the cost of a toilet (through a
subsidy) than to raise the priority people assign to sanita-
tion. The subsidy is also seen as critical to the new
government’s efforts to provide basic needs support to
historically marginalised black South Africans who were
denied basic services for political and racial reasons (Hartley
and Blackett, 1996).
Operation Hunger is a South African NGO which, in
1996, implemented a sanitation and health/hygiene pro-
motion initiative in Kwa-Jobe, KwaZulu/Natal. The pro-
gramme is unusual in South Africa because community
members have paid 44 percent of the capital costs of the
VIP latrines. The programme has not only provided im-
proved sanitation facilities for recipients, but also tested
whether historically-marginalised South Africans will will-
ingly contribute significant amounts of money towards the
costs of their toilets. The initiative is influenced by interna-
tional experience which suggests that subsidies are unsus-
tainable and ultimately undercut attempts to improve local
health and hygiene.
This paper probes Operation Hunger’s successes and
failures as it tried to mobilize support for community-
financing, to strengthen the sanitation committee and to
heighten local awareness of sanitation-related problems in
Kwa-Jobe. The paper also describes some of the pro-
gramme’s innovative features, such as training child-to-
child educators, and suggests implications for sanitation
policy, subsidisation and future programme implementa-
tion.
Overview of the Sanitation Programme in
Kwa-Jobe
The sanitation programme in Kwa-Jobe emerged from a
lengthy “PRA” programme concentrating on health-re-
lated challenges. This programme revealed that sanitation
was not a top priority for residents of Kwa-Jobe. Clean
water, jobs, electricity and agricultural support were con-
sistently identified as higher priorities by a wide range of
residents from different parts of the village (Breslin and
Madrid, 1997).
Nevertheless, “proper household” sessions in Kwa-Jobe
consistently highlighted the importance of toilets as an
integral part of a household’s physical infrastructure (Breslin
and Delius, 1996). Community members readily accepted
Operation Hunger’s offer to assist with a sanitation pro-
gramme. Interest was further heightened by the prospect of
creating local jobs and by modifying the programme so
that household contributions were reserved for further
development work. Residents agreed to pay R350
(US$78.47, exchange rate = R4.46/US$1.00, May 1997)
for a toilet as long as the payments were made over a period
of six months. Of that amount, R200 (US$44.84) is
contributed in advance to cover the full cost of labour.
Operation Hunger spent approximately six months train-
ing the local sanitation committee in project management.
The greatest difficulty was to ensure that local finances
were managed transparently by the committee. Regular
financial reports are given to the community development
committee, and we are currently exploring ways to com-
municate this information to the broader community in a
user-friendly manner, such as over the radio and on
community billboards.
An additional challenge was to find mechanisms to
ensure household compliance with the repayment sched-
ules. The mechanisms agreed upon include the use of the
tribal court system to discipline those who fail to pay. Also
incorporated is a staggered delivery system where Opera-
tion Hunger only releases funds and materials for new
applications once the sanitation committee demonstrates
that their accounts are up-to-date and previous recipients
have fully complied with the repayment schedule. To date,
only a single case has been referred to the tribal court. The
court upheld the recovery schedule, and naturally, as a
result, there has been 100 percent compliance repayment
with the schedule at the time of this writing.
The sanitation construction team was trained by both
field staff and a local resident who had built hygienic
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sanitation facilities in the past. The sanitation committee is
responsible for paying the construction team (R200 per
completed toilet, or US$44.84) and managing the remain-
ing finances.
Linked to the sanitation programme is a multi-phased
health/hygiene initiative. The first component of the cam-
paign was simply to promote sanitation as a health inter-
vention (in addition to a household infrastructure inter-
vention) in the community. This was done through a poster
competition at the local high schools, by using Radio Zulu
to promote the initiative, and by asking community health
workers to identify needy households and promote the
programme at the household level.
Second, efforts to promote the use and maintenance of
toilets were pursued. Mediums to promote these messages
include radio, locally-developed posters and community
health workers. The community health workers’ role in
this is particularly important as they regularly monitor
toilet cleanliness, maintenance and use at the household
level.
Third, a child-to-child programme has been initiated
where high school children are the primary advocates of
handwashing and the safe disposal of children’s (0-4 years)
faeces. This initiative includes the provision of handwashing
facilities at school toilets (basin, water, towel, soap/ash)
and signs developed by the children to promote
handwashing. Children who do not use these facilities at
school are reprimanded by other students.
The next stage of the child-to-child programme is to
determine whether a.) handwashing and the safe disposal
of infant faeces is being communicated by children within
their homes; and b.) improved handwashing and faeces
disposal is actually occurring within the household as a
result of the students’ messages and influence.
Lessons learned
A number of problems were encountered as the project
developed. These experiences have proven useful for fu-
ture programming. First, the initial deposit was originally
set too low (at R50, US$11.21) to cover the cost of labour
and as a result the sanitation committee went into over-
draft. This has now been rectified so that the initial deposit
is R200 (US$44.84). The programme has however slowed
since the deposit was raised, which could mean that many
households cannot afford to pay this initial lump-sum
payment. Alternatively, it may indicate that households
are willing to pay R50 (US$11.21) to initiate construction
but would rather use the larger sum of R200 (US$44.84)
for other purposes.
Second, the relationship between the sanitation commit-
tee and the local development committee is often strained.
Part of the reason is that the sanitation committee manages
a large amount of money but only wants to report to the
development committee and not have the latter involved in
financial decision-making. Conflicts over the use of the
extra money (in excess of labour costs and administrative
expenses) collected by the sanitation committee will likely
escalate.
An original goal of the cost recovery exercise was to use
the extra money collected to target households who can
not afford toilets with support. This objective has not been
reached at the time of writing, although the sanitation
committee, the local induna, and the community health
workers recently identified households who would qualify
for this cross-subsidy.
Operation Hunger also did not set up a proper construc-
tion monitoring programme at the start of the initiative. A
modified and more user-friendly “job card” (Murphy and
Still, 1995) is currently being designed to overcome this
limitation. Unfortunately, Operation Hunger has had to
play a large, time consuming, and in the end unnecessary
role in monitoring construction. A better strategy would
have been to strengthen the capacity of the sanitation
committee to monitor this aspect of the programme.
Perhaps the biggest lessons learned relate to:
• the on-going support required to strengthen the sanita-
tion committee’s capacity to manage the programme;
• the need to find multiple and reinforcing methods to
convey health/hygiene messages throughout the com-
munity.
Operation Hunger’s experience with community-level
management is that training must be on-going, practical
and field-based to be effective. In the past, Operation
Hunger would host a short management training course
for community committees only to find that the messages
had, unsurprisingly, not been internalised by trainees.
Problems always emerge when implementing, and these
problems can only be creatively addressed if training is
seen as a long-term process of capacity-building rather
than a one-off event.
Operation Hunger has also moved away from the “event
approach” to health/hygiene promotion. The organisation
no longer provides lectures on the linkage between water
supply, sanitation and health to trainees or depends solely
on large community meetings, poster competitions or
drama. Instead Operation Hunger tries to link its interven-
tions into on-going educational programmes offered in the
village (usually through the formal health sector) while
identifying alternative methods to communicate informa-
tion and monitor behavioural change at the household
level. Our efforts to understand what appropriate, locally-
specific hygiene problems are apparent in a given village
has been assisted by a behavioural survey administered at
the start of, and periodically during, the sanitation initia-
tive.
Operation Hunger staff are increasingly encouraged to:
• utilise available resources for promotional purposes;
• think beyond health/hygiene promotion events;
• think beyond the exclusive use of formal health care
sector personnel and infrastructure as vehicles for
health/hygiene promotion and behavioural change.
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Conclusions
Operation Hunger’s experience suggests that there is scope
for South Africa to reconsider its subsidy policies, al-
though it is recognised that the politics surrounding subsi-
dies is considerable and just. Two alternatives could
nevertheless be considered.
First, a loan as opposed to an outright subsidy appears
to be possible. Our experience suggests that poor people
will invest in household infrastructure, like toilets, if a
scheme can be devised that recognises the financial con-
straints they face. Loans with repayments spread out over
long periods of time are possible. Moreover, repayment
schedules which recognise and accommodate periods of
financial stress within poor households, such as when
school payments are due or before the planting season in
areas where agricultural production is important to house-
hold sustainability, have an even greater chance of success
and support at the local level.
The key will be to identify a range of institutions with the
potential infrastructure, resources and skills to promote a
loan-based initiative. Institutions like the KwaZulu Fi-
nance Corporation (KFC) could be considered under such
a scheme. Government may wish to pilot some loan-based
programmes in the future to see if Operation Hunger’s
experiences in KwaZulu/Natal can be replicated and
brought to scale by institutions with far greater financial
resources and capacity than Operation Hunger.
Second, even though subsidies will continue, implement-
ing agents could try to increase the household cost recov-
ery element by promoting schemes that redirect the rev-
enue back into the village. This money could be managed
locally and used for other development interventions in the
village, thus increasing the impact of an initial sanitation
intervention. By redirecting the funds back into a commu-
nity, more local jobs could be created, village infrastruc-
ture could be upgraded or developed, and local revenue
could be used to assist the poorest households who will
struggle to meet even minimal repayment schedules.
Debate continues on the future level of subsidised sup-
port for sanitation. If the gap between the full cost of a
toilet and the subsidy widens in real terms, then alternative
financing strategies will inevitably be required to assist
poorer households. Either lower cost sanitation options,
such as sanplats, or alternative funding mechanisms, like
loans, will have to be reconsidered if government’s objec-
tive of providing some service for all is to be attained. It is
hoped that Operation Hunger’s experience in Kwa-Jobe
will be useful to programme managers, implementers and
policy makers as they struggle with this difficult issue.
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